Some civil societies organizations have reacted to the Electoral Act 2026 signed into law by President Bola Tinubu on Wednesday in Abuja. Here is the full text of their press conference on Thursday.
Electoral Act 2026: A Missed Opportunity for Transformative Electoral Reform
Civil Society Condemns Failure to Address Critical Gaps, and Commits to Vigilant Implementation Monitoring Ahead of the 2027 Elections
The undersigned civil society organizations acknowledge the passage of the Electoral Bill 2026 by the National Assembly and the Presidential assent granted to the Electoral Act 2026 which formally repeals and replaces the Electoral Act 2022. However, we cannot ignore the deeply troubling manner in which the legislation was processed and passed. The speed, and opacity, raise serious concerns about legislative transparency and the commitment of lawmakers to genuine electoral reform. We must therefore state clearly and without equivocation: the Electoral Act 2026 that has now been signed into law is a missed opportunity for the transformative electoral reform that Nigeria requires and that Nigerian citizens deserve.
At a time when public confidence in elections remains fragile, this law should have decisively strengthened transparency, eliminated ambiguities, and deepened safeguards against manipulation. Instead, it creates more vulnerabilities in the electoral process. Throughout the legislative process, the undersigned civil society organizations engaged constructively with the National Assembly, submitted detailed citizens’ memoranda, participated in public hearings, and engaged publicly and privately for specific amendments that would have strengthened the integrity, inclusiveness, and accountability of Nigeria’s electoral framework. Some of those calls were heeded. Many were not. The Act that has been enacted preserves important provisions from the 2022 framework but leaves dangerous loopholes unaddressed, and introduces new barriers to political participation.
Civil society verdict on the legislative process
We register our profound concern about the process through which the Electoral Bill was passed between the third reading and adoption of the harmonized version of the bill. The final version of the Bill voted upon reportedly contained last-minute amendments that were neither published nor made available to civil society or the broader public prior to adoption. More concerning is that the harmonized Bill produced by the Conference Committee was adopted by both chambers via voice vote without prior distribution of the final consolidated text to all members as was reported by some legislators.
Some legislators subsequently acknowledged publicly that they voted based on assurances from Senate and House leadership rather than their own review of the final legislative language.
This fundamentally violates the principle of informed legislative consent and weakens parliamentary accountability.
Debate on critical clauses including provisions relating to real-time electronic transmission of results was reportedly curtailed.
Legislative changes introduced in the final hours before a vote, without publication, scrutiny, or structured debate, are inconsistent with the transparency standards expected in democratic lawmaking. Members cannot meaningfully legislate on provisions they have not reviewed in their final form, and the public cannot engage a process from which it is excluded. Electoral law is the architecture of democratic competition. Its legitimacy depends not only on its content but on the openness and credibility of the process through which it is enacted. When reforms are rushed, consolidated without scrutiny, and adopted without full disclosure, public confidence inevitably erodes. This approach does not reflect deliberative lawmaking. It reflects a troubling departure from the transparency and accountability that electoral reform demands.
Presidential Assent Despite Citizens’ Appeals
In the period between the National Assembly’s passage of the Bill and the granting of Presidential assent, civil society organizations convened multiple protests and public engagements calling for critical safeguards to be preserved including real-time electronic transmission of results, downloadable voter cards, and the retention of established electoral timelines. These were not partisan demands; they were grounded in legal precedent, technical feasibility, and the imperative to protect electoral credibility ahead of 2027.The decision of the Presidency to grant assent without addressing the substantive legal, technical, and democratic concerns raised by civil society, professional bodies, and even some members of the National Assembly signal a troubling prioritization of political expediency over electoral integrity. Electoral reform should be guided by broad consultation and consensus, not compressed timelines and executive finality. This sets a dangerous precedent: that foundational democratic laws may be enacted despite credible warnings from stakeholders charged with safeguarding electoral transparency. Such an approach risks eroding public trust at a time when confidence in the electoral system remains fragile and must be deliberately strengthened, not casually tested.
PROVISIONS WE ACKNOWLEDGE AND WELCOME
1. Downloadable Voter Card (Section 18): The provision allowing downloadable voter card from INEC’s website will increase voter participation and reduce disenfranchisement often associated with missing or unissued voter cards.
2. Disability-Inclusive Voter Registration (Section 9): For the first time in Nigeria’s electoral history, the voter register is required to be disaggregated by disability type. This is a significant advance in line with Nigeria’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). We call on INEC to work closely with the National Commission for Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD) and disability inclusion organizations to ensure this provision is operationalized with dignity and accuracy.
3. Enhanced Penalties for Result Falsification (Sections 62, 71): Returning officers who deliberately falsify results now face a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment without option of fine. Presiding officers who fail to sign result sheets face mandatory 3-year imprisonment. These are among the strongest anti-fraud sanctions in Nigeria’s legislative history and represent a commitment to accountability that we strongly support.
WHERE THE ELECTORAL ACT 2026 FALLS SHORT
Despite these gains, the Electoral Act 2026 contains significant flaws that will undermine electoral integrity, entrench incumbency advantage, and exclude millions of Nigerians from meaningful political participation. Civil society raised each of these issues with evidence-based recommendations during the legislative process. The failure to address them represents a failure of political will.
1. Electronic transmission of results: Section 60(3) mandates electronic transmission but includes a proviso: if transmission ‘fails as a result of communication failure,’ the physical EC8A form becomes the primary source for collation. This language is unchanged from the version civil society flagged as dangerous. ‘Communication failure’ is undefined. There is no independent verification mechanism. There are no consequences for deliberate sabotage disguised as technical failure. The 2023 elections demonstrated how this ambiguity can be exploited. This loophole will be tested again in 2027 and the Act provides no protection.
2. Compressed Timelines for key electoral activities: The review to timelines for the release of notice of elections (from 360 days to 300 days), submission of list of candidates (180 days to 120 days) and INEC publication of list of candidates (150 days to 60 days) increases logistics risk and puts the electoral system under pressure. For instance, shorter timelines for publishing list of candidates will affect production of sensitive materials like ballot papers.
3. Restricting the filing of reports to INEC officials to activate the review of election results: Section 65 of the Electoral Act empowers INEC to review election results within seven days where declarations are made under duress or in violation contrary to procedures for result collation prescribed in the Act. The Act provides that all reviews of election shall be conducted only when a report is filed by an INEC official. This provision bars political parties, candidates, accredited observers, and their agents from activating the review process, even where they tender compelling evidence of a manipulated and unlawful results declaration. Restricting the power of review to reports filed by INEC officials, some of whom may be complicit, is against the spirit behind the power of review vested in INEC.
4. Section 75(6) imposes a ₦50 million administrative fee for new political party registration. This is not administrative cost recovery; it is a financial moat designed to exclude grassroots movements, youth-led parties, and non-elite political formations from formal competition. It is anti-democratic and anti-constitutional. Political pluralism is a right, not a privilege reserved for those with access to extraordinary capital.
5. Mode of party primaries: Section 84 restricts parties to only two options for candidate nomination: direct primaries or consensus. By removing the option of indirect primaries, which, when properly regulated, can offer a more structured and less chaotic selection process, the Act reduces flexibility and pushes parties towards methods that are highly vulnerable to vote-buying (direct primaries) or godfather manipulation (consensus)
WHAT HAPPENS NOW
The assent to the Electoral Act 2026 is not the end of the reform process. It is the beginning of the implementation phase and civil society will be present, vigilant, and vocal at every stage.
Immediate Priorities for INEC
1. Issue a Revised 2027 Election Timetable Without Delay: In light of the new 300-day notice requirement under the Electoral Act 2026, INEC must urgently publish a revised timetable and schedule for the 2027 general elections. Certainty in electoral timelines is essential for political parties, candidates, civil society, security agencies, and voters to prepare adequately.
2. Publish Comprehensive Regulations Under Section 151: INEC must immediately issue clear and detailed regulations addressing:The definition and threshold for IReV “communication failure,” including transparent verification procedures;
Standards for monitoring, observing, and certifying political party primaries;
Disability-inclusive voter registration procedures, ensuring full compliance with constitutional guarantees of equality and inclusion. Regulatory ambiguity at this stage will only invite disputes and litigation later.
3. Conduct a Nationwide IReV Transmission Simulation: INEC should organize a national simulation exercise of IReV electronic transmission across all 176,866 polling units, with independent observers present.
The Commission must publish a comprehensive technical report detailing:
Success and failure rates;
Geographical distribution of connectivity gaps;
Identified vulnerabilities; and
Concrete remediation plans ahead of 2027.
Call to Political Parties
Commit Publicly to Defending Electronic Transmission: Political parties must refuse to exploit any ambiguity surrounding IReV transmission. Parties should publicly commit that their agents will:Insist on electronic transmission at every polling unit;Document and report suspicious “communication failures” in real time; and
Escalate concerns through lawful channels.Electoral integrity cannot depend solely on the Commission; parties must demonstrate institutional responsibility.
Call To The National Assembly
Publish the Signed Electoral Act 2026 Immediately: The National Assembly must promptly publish the final version of the Electoral Act 2026 as signed into law to ensure public awareness, legal clarity, and stakeholder engagement.
In conclusion, the Electoral Act 2026 is now law. It is imperfect. It is incomplete. It leaves dangerous loopholes open and erects new barriers to participation. But it is also the legal framework within which the 2027 elections will be conducted and it is our responsibility as citizens, media, civil society etc, to ensure that the elections conducted under this law are credible, transparent, inclusive, and reflective of the will of the Nigerian people.
Signed:
Centre for Media and Society (CEMESO)
The Kukah Centre
International Press Centre (IPC)
ElectHer
Nigerian Women Trust Fund
TAF Africa
Yiaga Africa
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