How a country once notorious for gang violence dramatically reduced killings, reclaimed communities and restored public confidence — and why Nigeria’s battle against terrorism, banditry and kidnapping could benefit from studying its experience.
By Samuel Torlumun, Abuja
For years, El Salvador was synonymous with violence, criminal gangs, extortion and murder. Residents lived under the shadow of powerful criminal organisations that controlled neighbourhoods, terrorised businesses, recruited children and determined who could move freely within certain communities.
At the height of the violence in 2015, the Central American country recorded approximately 106.8 homicides per 100,000 people, making it one of the world’s most dangerous countries.
A decade later, the narrative has changed dramatically.
Under President Nayib Bukele, El Salvador has recorded a remarkable decline in reported killings, with the government putting its homicide rate at 1.9 per 100,000 people in 2024. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its 2025 country report, acknowledged the country’s dramatic improvement in public safety, attributing it partly to strengthened police and military capacity and measures to control criminal gangs.
The transformation has attracted international attention, with Bukele’s security strategy becoming a subject of debate among governments struggling with organised crime.
For Nigeria, where terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence and organised criminal activities continue to threaten lives and livelihoods, the Salvadoran experience presents an important opportunity for reflection.
From the insurgency in the North-East to banditry in the North-West and North-Central regions, the security challenges confronting Nigeria have become increasingly complex. Communities have been displaced, farmers driven away from their farmlands, businesses disrupted and families separated through abductions.
The European Union Agency for Asylum, in its November 2025 security assessment, documented the continuing activities of armed groups, kidnappings and attacks on military positions in parts of northern Nigeria.
Against this background, the question is whether Nigeria can draw useful lessons from a country that has demonstrated how determined security policies can substantially reduce the influence of organised criminal groups.
Although Nigeria’s security situation is considerably different from that of El Salvador, ten important lessons stand out.
- Political will and decisive leadership
One of the defining characteristics of Bukele’s security policy has been the elevation of public safety to the centre of national governance.
After assuming office in 2019, he made the fight against criminal gangs a major priority of his administration.
His government subsequently introduced a comprehensive security campaign targeting the country’s notorious gangs, particularly Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18.
The strategy involved strengthening security institutions, increasing operational capacity and pursuing criminal networks.
The results have been substantial in terms of reported homicides, although the methods employed have generated considerable controversy.
For Nigeria, the lesson is that the fight against insecurity requires sustained political commitment rather than intermittent security operations triggered by public outrage following major attacks.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration must ensure that the protection of lives and property remains a measurable priority across all levels of government.
Security commitments must translate into effective operations, adequate funding, institutional accountability and sustained protection of vulnerable communities. - Intelligence-driven security operations
El Salvador’s campaign against criminal gangs involved identifying their leadership structures, operational networks and areas of influence. This underscores the importance of intelligence in confronting organised crime.
Nigeria’s security challenges require an equally sophisticated approach. Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), armed bandit groups and kidnapping syndicates operate through networks that sometimes extend across state and national borders.
Simply deploying soldiers after attacks have occurred cannot provide a lasting solution. Nigeria must invest more in intelligence gathering, surveillance technology, satellite monitoring, drones and effective intelligence-sharing among security agencies.
More importantly, security agencies must identify the financiers, informants, weapons suppliers and other individuals sustaining criminal organisations.
The objective should be to dismantle the entire criminal infrastructure rather than merely arresting or eliminating individual operatives. - Reclaiming territories from criminal groups
For decades, gangs exercised considerable influence over neighbourhoods in El Salvador, determining residents’ movements and imposing illegal levies on businesses.
The Bukele administration’s security campaign sought to dismantle this territorial control and restore the authority of the state.
Nigeria faces a related challenge in communities where armed groups raid villages, kidnap residents, collect illegal taxes and prevent farmers from accessing their farmlands.
The lesson is that military operations must go beyond conducting raids and pursuing criminals. When security forces clear a community of armed groups, the government must establish a permanent presence through police stations, intelligence networks, local administration and essential public services. Otherwise, criminals may return once military operations are suspended.
Reclaiming territories must therefore mean restoring normal civilian life, not simply recording military victories. - Strengthening the police and military
El Salvador’s security improvement has been associated with increased security expenditure and the strengthening of its police and military institutions.
The IMF has specifically highlighted the relationship between enhanced security capacity and the country’s improvement in public safety.
Nigeria must similarly address the operational challenges confronting its security agencies. Soldiers and police officers require modern equipment, intelligence support, adequate training, reliable transportation and improved welfare.
The government must also strengthen the capacity of security institutions to respond rapidly to emergencies. Beyond purchasing sophisticated equipment, there must be effective maintenance, proper deployment and accountability for public resources allocated to security.
A poorly equipped or inadequately motivated security force cannot effectively confront well-organised criminal networks. - No protection for criminal sponsors
One important aspect of fighting organised crime is the need to investigate the networks that finance and sustain criminal activities.
Criminal organisations rarely operate entirely in isolation. They depend on sources of funding, logistics, intelligence and other forms of support.
Nigeria must therefore intensify investigations into individuals suspected of financing terrorism, supplying weapons or facilitating kidnapping and banditry.
Allegations involving political officeholders, public officials and influential individuals must be investigated professionally, with prosecution wherever sufficient evidence exists.
El Salvador’s experience also offers a warning about the dangers of inconsistent government dealings with criminal gangs. Previous negotiations and alleged secret arrangements with gang leaders have attracted serious scrutiny.
Nigeria must ensure that security policy is transparent, consistent and governed by the law. Peace negotiations, where necessary, should not become opportunities for criminals to secure impunity or reorganise their operations. - Effective border security
Nigeria’s geographical location and extensive international borders present considerable security challenges.
The movement of illegal weapons, ammunition and armed groups across borders complicates the fight against terrorism and banditry. The problem is particularly important in the Lake Chad Basin and parts of the North-West, where criminal and extremist networks can exploit difficult terrain and cross-border connections.
Nigeria should strengthen border surveillance through modern electronic monitoring, intelligence-sharing, improved patrols and cooperation with neighbouring countries.
Regional security cooperation involving Niger, Chad, Cameroon and other countries must become more effective. The Multinational Joint Task Force operating around the Lake Chad Basin also has an important role in coordinating regional responses to insurgency.
Security cannot be sustained if criminal organisations can freely exploit weak border controls. - Community participation in security
Another important lesson is that restoring security requires more than military intervention. Communities must become active participants in identifying and preventing criminal activities.
In Nigeria, traditional rulers, religious leaders, community associations, youth organisations and local government authorities possess valuable knowledge about their environments.
Government should establish credible community intelligence structures that allow residents to report suspicious movements and criminal activities without exposing themselves to retaliation.
However, such arrangements must be properly supervised to prevent the emergence of uncontrolled vigilante groups and further human rights violations. Community participation should strengthen the relationship between citizens and legitimate security institutions.
The ultimate objective is to make communities partners in maintaining peace rather than passive victims of insecurity. - Addressing poverty, unemployment and the economic roots of insecurity
Although El Salvador has made significant progress in reducing reported gang violence, its economic challenges have not disappeared. The IMF has emphasised that improvements in security must be accompanied by reforms capable of promoting inclusive economic growth and employment.
This is particularly relevant to Nigeria. Poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, drug abuse and limited economic opportunities can make vulnerable young people susceptible to recruitment by criminal organisations.
In several rural communities, insecurity has destroyed the economic activities that once sustained families. Farmers have abandoned their farms, traders have relocated and young people have lost access to productive opportunities.
Nigeria must therefore integrate economic development into its national security strategy. Government should prioritise vocational training, agricultural investment, rural infrastructure, youth employment and educational opportunities in vulnerable communities.
Security operations must be accompanied by programmes that give young people alternatives to criminal activities.
Winning the battle against insecurity requires not only defeating existing criminal organisations but also preventing the emergence of new ones.
9. Respecting human rights and the rule of law
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Bukele’s security model is its treatment of human rights. Following a surge in gang violence in March 2022, El Salvador introduced a state of emergency that suspended certain constitutional protections and facilitated mass arrests.
The policy coincided with a dramatic reduction in reported killings. However, organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House have documented allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture, deaths in detention, overcrowded prisons and restrictions on civil liberties.
These concerns raise important questions about the long-term sustainability and human cost of the approach. Nigeria must be particularly careful not to interpret El Salvador’s experience as an endorsement of indiscriminate arrests or prolonged detention without trial.
The Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to fair hearing and protection against unlawful detention. The fight against terrorism and banditry must therefore be conducted within the framework of the law.
A successful security strategy must protect innocent citizens while ensuring that individuals responsible for criminal activities are brought to justice. The government must not allow the fight against insecurity to become another source of insecurity for ordinary Nigerians.
10. Establishing measurable security targets
One reason El Salvador’s transformation has attracted international attention is the significant decline in its reported homicide rate. Government figures indicate that the rate fell from approximately 106.8 per 100,000 people in 2015 to 1.9 in 2024.
Although questions have been raised about the methodology and transparency of some official figures, the reduction represents a major change in the country’s reported security situation.
Nigeria needs a more transparent system of measuring security performance. Rather than relying on general assurances that security is improving, the government should regularly publish independently verifiable information covering:
- Reduction in terrorist attacks and civilian casualties.
- Reduction in kidnapping and ransom-related crimes.
- Number of displaced persons able to return home safely.
- Number of communities recovered from armed groups.
- Arrest and prosecution of criminal financiers.
- Reduction in attacks on farmers and rural communities.
- Improved response times to security emergencies.
These indicators would enable Nigerians to assess the effectiveness of government security policies. Security performance should be measured by the extent to which citizens can live, work, travel and conduct their businesses without fear.
THE NIGERIAN QUESTION: CAN THE BUKELE MODEL WORK HERE?
While El Salvador’s experience provides useful lessons, Nigeria must recognise the fundamental differences between the two countries.
El Salvador is a relatively small country with a population of approximately 6.4 million people. Nigeria has more than 200 million inhabitants, a much larger geographical area and a more complicated security environment.
El Salvador’s principal security challenge involved organised urban gangs with identifiable structures and territorial influence. Nigeria, on the other hand, faces multiple threats, including ideological insurgency, transnational terrorism, rural banditry, kidnapping syndicates, communal conflicts and organised criminal networks.
Consequently, a policy that works in El Salvador cannot simply be transferred wholesale to Nigeria. Nigeria requires a security strategy adapted to its federal structure, geographical realities, intelligence requirements and constitutional obligations.
Nevertheless, the central principle remains relevant: the state must restore its capacity to protect citizens and prevent criminal organisations from exercising authority over communities.
WHAT PRESIDENT TINUBU’S GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE AWAY
For President Tinubu and his security advisers, the Salvadoran experience raises important policy considerations. First, national security must be treated as a continuous national priority, supported by adequate funding and measurable performance targets.
Second, intelligence gathering must become the foundation of security operations, with greater emphasis on identifying criminal financiers and dismantling their networks.
Third, communities recovered from armed groups must receive permanent security protection and government services.
Fourth, border surveillance and regional cooperation must be strengthened to restrict the movement of criminal organisations.
Fifth, security operations must be accompanied by economic programmes that address poverty, unemployment and the vulnerability of young people.
Finally, security agencies must remain accountable to the Constitution and the Nigerian people.
Conclusion: Beyond the Bukele Experience
El Salvador’s experience has demonstrated that a country burdened by years of organised criminal violence can record a substantial improvement in public safety through sustained government action. Its reported reduction in homicides has changed the country’s international security profile and generated considerable interest among governments confronting organised crime.
But the experience also carries warnings about the dangers of excessive state power, mass detention and the weakening of democratic safeguards. For Nigeria, the real lesson is not that national security requires abandoning democratic principles or adopting every method employed by Bukele.
Rather, it is that insecurity must be confronted with political commitment, effective intelligence, professional security institutions, community participation, economic development and accountability.
Nigeria does not necessarily need a Bukele-style government. It needs a security system capable of delivering the protection that citizens expect from the state. The measure of success should be straightforward: farmers must return to their farmlands, children must attend school without fear of abduction, businesses must operate without extortion, travellers must move safely between communities and families must be able to sleep peacefully in their homes.
Ultimately, the greatest achievement of any government is not the number of security operations it announces, but the number of citizens who can live without fear.
That is the security transformation Nigeria must pursue.
